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Abstract:  
 
Combating the growing threat to banks of distributed denial-of-service attacks will demand more 
than keeping pace in a technological arms race; it will also require greater information sharing 
among banks and other cybersecurity entities. 
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Article:  
 
Images of the recent financial crisis in Greece included photos of closed banks and crowds of 
angry citizens and tourists who were incapable of withdrawing cash from ATM machines. When 
the banks finally opened, the lines of waiting customers were long, and the amount of cash 
withdrawals was limited to prevent runs on the banks. The lesson was clear: separating people 
from access to their money causes social panic and unrest. 
 
The Greek situation was triggered by government bankruptcy, but similar crises can be caused 
by cyberattacks against the financial sector—including website disruption, payment-card fraud, 
and internal network infiltration. Many malware products to breach banking systems exist.(1) 
Banks are attractive hacking targets, not only for stealing money but also for acquiring highly 
sensitive private information about customers such as national identification and Social Security 
numbers as well as detailed histories of past payments. Successful cyberattacks can lead to the 
deletion of records, draining of account balances, and frozen (inaccessible) networks. 
 
AN INDUSTRY UNDER ATTACK 
 
Unsurprisingly, banks and other financial institutions experience a disproportionately high share 
of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Such attacks, which have targeted banks, online 
casinos, e-commerce hubs, and other companies highly dependent on digital technologies for 
more than a decade,(2) have dramatically increased in recent years.(3) For example, between 
July 2014 and September 2015 a cybercriminal group called DD4BC (DDoS for Bitcoin) 
launched nearly 90 attacks against financial-services companies.(4) Many victims didn’t pay pay 
ransom, but enough did to make the extortion profitable, spurring DD4BC copycats.(5,6) 
 
Despite these threats, some banks have failed to appropriately enhance their cyberdefenses. A 
2014 report by New York State’s Department of Financial Services, which regulates banks and 
insurance companies, found that most institutions surveyed had suffered a successful cyberattack 
during the previous three years.(7) There are several reasons for this. Some banks, out of 
ignorance or willful neglect, continue to rely on older IT systems. In addition, increased mergers 
and acquisitions in the financial industry have forced the integration of distinct systems that birth 
new cybersecurity challenges. Finally, banks face a wide range of bad actors—from 
cybercriminals to publicity-seeking “hactivists” to terrorists to foreign entities conducting 
cyberwarfare and espionage.(8) 
 
Realizing the seriousness of financial DDoS attacks on society, governments have begun to 
introduce regulations that spell out best practices, minimum standards, and crisis-response 
guidelines to ensure banking service availability and accessibility. For instance, US federal law 
requires banks and other financial institutions to monitor for DDoS attacks and have plans in 
place to mitigate against such attacks.(9) The Monetary Authority of Singapore’s “4 × 4” rule 
requires banks, under penalty of fines, to correct an outage of online services in less than four 
hours and to have no more than four outages per year.(10) In June 2016, India’s central bank 
issued a circular requiring banks to have a Cyber Crisis Management Plan in case of DDoS or 
other cyberattacks.(11) 
 
FIGHTING BACK 
 
Financial institutions are trying to adapt to the increasing frequency and diversity of 
cyberattacks. According to an April 2016 survey by the information services and analytics firm 
Neustar, 88 percent of financial-services respondents detected DDoS attacks in less than two 
hours and 72 percent responded to such attacks within the same amount of time.(12) 
 
Like healthcare companies, banks have the responsibility of securing particularly sensitive 
personal information, and thus must enact robust countermeasures to ensure adequate 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their services and data. Of these three, we believe 
that availability deserves extra attention and is our focus here. 
 
Lack of access to personal assets clearly creates customer dissatisfaction and affects a bank’s 
brand and reputation. Further, service unavailability disproportionately affects a bank’s bottom 
line compared to other businesses. An Incapsula-commissioned survey of IT managers from 270 
North American organizations found the average cost of a DDoS attack to be $40,000/hour; 15 
percent of respondents put the cost at under $5,000/hour and 15 percent estimated it to be over 
$100,000/hour.12 In contrast, the Neustar study found that DDoS attacks cost most banks about 
$100,000/hour, with more than a third of banks reporting even higher costs.(12) 
 
In addition to the operating losses resulting from service unavailability, banks face stiff penalties 
from regulatory agencies. For example, after a botched software upgrade in June 2012 by the 
Royal Bank of Scotland prevented millions of customers in the UK from accessing their 
accounts, government regulators slapped the bank with £56 million in fines—on top of the £125 
million in costs arising from the service disruption itself.(13) 
 
Financial institutions commonly employ four strategies to address cyberattacks and maintain 
service functionality (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1. Strategies to address cyberattacks. 
 
 
Use alternative communication and service channels 
 
To increase service resilience and mitigate network failures, banks can use alternative 
communication and service channels. For example, like many other banks, the Louisville, 
Kentucky–based Republic Bank lets customers access their accounts through both mobile apps 
and text banking if the website is ever down due to a DDoS attack or other source of disruption 
(www.republicbank.com/home/help/security/ddos). Banks also use social media such as 
Facebook and YouTube to increase customers’ knowledge about and awareness of problems.(14) 
Some banks have a dedicated Twitter handle to help answer customers’ queries and resolve 
complaints.(15) 
 
Employ specialized DDoS monitoring and mitigation technology 
 
In addition to implementing do-it-yourself IT techniques such as overprovisioning network 
bandwidth and rerouting malicious traffic to another location (“blackholing”), banks can 
purchase and install customized equipment that monitors network traffic for DDoS attacks and 
blocks them. Perhaps 5 percent of large banks have such products. Financial institutions that 
can’t afford or lack the expertise to maintain in-house systems can outsource DDoS monitoring 
and mitigation to specialty providers such as Akamai-Prolexic, Verisign, and Corero Network 
Security.(16) 
 
Work with related parties to minimize the impact on affected services 
 
By attacking banks when customer services are most in demand—for example, around 
holidays—cyberextortionists can increase the probability of ransom being paid. To minimize 
attacks’ impact at these times, banks can coordinate with related parties to reduce the criticalness 
and urgency of affected services, such as by using redundancy. 
 
Pay ransom to halt cyberattacks 
 
Reliable statistics aren’t publically available, but it’s well known that banks sometimes pay 
ransom to halt cyberattacks. According to the FBI’s New York office, during April–July 2015, 
more than 100 companies in the financial-services sector experienced cyberattacks tied with 
ransom requests running in the tens of thousands of dollars.(17) One Gartner analyst has 
estimated that targeted institutions pay ransoms of $5 for every $100 worth of damage they could 
suffer if the extracted data were published.(18) Of course, customers ultimately pay this cost. 
 
EMERGING COUNTERMEASURES 
 
Under growing pressure from customers, shareholders, and government regulators, financial 
institutions are exploring new approaches to improve their cybersecurity. One strategy is to 
educate the public about the risks of cyberattacks and to promote awareness of ways to better 
protect personal data and the devices used to access it.(19) Another is to employ yet more 
communication and service channels as insulation against a breach or outage—given the rising 
frequency and severity of cyberattacks, it’s a matter of when, not if, a given bank will be 
targeted. 
 
On the regulatory front, lawmakers are increasingly concerned about cyberattacks against US 
financial institutions. In October 2014, leaders of the US Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs penned a letter to the nation’s top financial regulators—the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency, and chairs of the Federal Reserve, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and National Credit Union Administration—requesting 
details on what specific steps were being taken to protect the financial system against 
cyberattacks.(20) 
 
Cybersecurity is a top priority for New York’s Department of Financial Services (DFS).(21) In 
September 2014, the DFS proposed a regulation that would require banks, insurance companies, 
and other financial institutions chartered in the state to establish and maintain a cybersecurity 
program, adopt a written cybersecurity policy, and designate a chief information security officer 
to implement, oversee, and enforce both.(22) The following month, in the in the wake of a high-
profile cyberattack against JPMorgan Chase and other financial firms that compromised the data 
of 76 million households, DFS superintendent Benjamin Lawsky met with senior leaders of 
regulated entities to discuss their ability to withstand and prepare for cyberattacks by taking more 
proactive measures, such as tracking the vulnerabilities of third-party vendors, building 
cybersecurity expertise into their boards, and investing in cyberinsurance.(23) In December 
2014, Lawsky announced that New York financial institutions would have to comply with 
stricter cybersecurity requirements during examinations.(24) 
 
Greater information sharing is a central theme in emerging countermeasures. One problem for 
banks that outsource DDoS monitoring and mitigation is that such services “do not necessarily 
communicate with other companies that have not bought the same technology—or with other 
technology the same company has bought.”(25) To address this problem, the not-for-profit 
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (www.fsisac.com) has launched a 
new software platform, the Critical Infrastructure Notification System (CINS), that distills 
cyberthreat information into actionable intelligence to member companies worldwide nearly 
simultaneously. CINS is designed to make it more difficult for hackers to deploy the same 
malware against multiple banks. 
 
When people are disconnected from their money, they quickly lose trust in the institution 
managing it. Successful DDoS attacks exacerbate this problem by disrupting service availability, 
making robust cyberdefense essential in this industry. Although most such attacks are financially 
motivated, the socioeconomic importance of banks also makes them an a top target for 
ideological or geopolitical hackers, in some cases armed with cutting-edge malware tools and 
abundant resources. Combating this threat will demand more than keeping pace in a 
technological arms race; it will also require greater information sharing among banks as well as 
between banks and government agencies, companies in other critical industries, and 
cybersecurity researchers. This in turn will require transforming the industry’s long-standing 
culture of secrecy to one of greater transparency. 
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